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Reply Argument
I.
28 U.S.C. 1441(c) Can Not Support Removal; Removal Unreasonable
BYU states they relied on 28 U.S.C. §1441(c) in their efforts to remove the
state case to federal court. See Brief of Appellee (App. Br.) at 11.
BYU however fails to quote the text of §1441(c).
§ 1441(c) states:
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within
the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case
may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or,
in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.
§1331 states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
The facts are not in dispute. When BYU attempted removal, there were no
"claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" found
in the underlying case of this appeal.
Because there were no "claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States" found in the underlying case of this appeal and
because 1441(c) requires that a case being removed to federal court must be joined
with "claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States",
removal was improper.

No reasonable attorney reading 1441(c) and observing that that state case
had no federal cause of action would believe that they could remove the case to
federal court under 1441 (c).
An attorney is presumed to have a high degree of intelligence and ability to
use that intelligence. They have been schooled at the doctorate level. Medical
doctors are also schooled at the doctorate level. They to must follow proper
procedure. A medical doctor reading the proper procedure on how to perform a
certain procedure, then ignores the plain language of that procedure and does
something completely different which then causes injury, can not simply shrug off
the mistake and liability for the mistake. A standard of competence is in place for
the doctor and they must be held to it. If they are not skilled and competent they
cause injury.
It was within the assumed competency of Counsel for BYU to read 1441(c)
and realize that it did not provide authority to remove because no cause of action
existed under §1331.
BYU Counsel not acting reasonably must be found liable for sanctions and
penalizing Appellant for attempting to redress the wrong of counsel for the
Appellee is incorrect.

II.
The Arrest Warrant Improper
A. Rule 69 Does Not Exist
Appellant questions whether BYU made a typographical error as they state.
Rule 69 does not exist. That should be enough. To rely on a non-existent Rule for
support to arrest a person is unconscionable.

Rules are in place for a reason.

They can not be discarded or overlooked. Proper procedure must be followed. If
not what then is due process of law and why does the legislature and executive
branches of government pass laws for the judiciary to execute and follow.
But Rule 64, assuming that really was the statute relied on by BYU, does
not authorize the movant for a supplemental hearing to issue an Order threatening
the arrest of a person for not attending. The whole matter is troubling from a
judicial perspective.
That BYU would mislead the judge that Rule 69 existed and allowed for the
arrest of Appellant for not attending is unconscionable. The court system is not
here to guess at statutes and manipulate the system to BYU's advantage. It is here
to serve the interests of the state, and the state has set forth the proper manner in
which things are to be done. Rule 69 does not exist. Rule 69 was relied on by
BYU for the authority for its motion and arrest warrant clause of the motion for
that supplemental hearing. That alone should be sufficient to vacate the entire
mess created.
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B. Signature Stamp Lacking As Required by UCRJA 4-403
A close look at the signature of the Order for supplemental hearing raises
serious concerns as to whether it was mechanically signed. Appellant, after close
examination, believes, and comparison with the other signatures would support
this, that it not signed by the actual judge. Remand would be proper to determine
this if the Court can not take judicial notice of the signature on that Order.
If it is mechanically signed, then the clerk imprinting the signature must,
according to Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration Rule 4-403 (1)(I)
and (2) sign their name below the mechanical signature.
Because the Order for the hearing was mechanically signed and not
subsequently signed by the clerk issuing it, as required by 4-403, the Order is then
invalid.
Here, the weight of the evidence supports Appellant and begins to
accumulate. Not only was Rule 69 non-existant, but the actual Order for the
hearing violated 4-403.
As an officer of the court, BYU is assumed to be aware of 4-403 and is in
all probability aware that it was issued by some clerk as they went personally to the
court to obtain the Order ex parte.
C. URPC3.3
The accumulation of evidence in Appellant's favor does not stop there.
Additionally, BYU violated URPC3.3(d).

BYU simply could have followed standard judicial procedure and filed a
motion with the court for the supplemental proceeding, allowed Appellant a
chance to respond (old-fashioned due process of law), and the court would then
make a decision after hearing both sides on the matter.
But BYU did not follow standard judicial procedure. They did everything
ex parte. While BYU cites to no pressing reason for the need of an immediate ex
parte hearing, they nonetheless sought everything ex parte and in so doing
URPC3.3(d) must govern their actions.
BYU App. Br. at 16 states "Specifically, Mr. Raiser's alleged poverty is not
a material fact". Nothing could be farther from the truth.
In order to prove contempt for failure to comply with court order it must be
shown that person cited for contempt (1) knew what was required, (2) had ability
to comply, and (3) intentionally failed or refused to do so, and trial court must
enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to each of three
substantive elements for contempt. See In re Cannatella, 132 P.3d 684, 686
(2006).
In the instant matter, assuming Appellant was being held in contempt of
court, prior to issuing that bench warrant, the lower court would have had to make
some finding as to whether Appellant had the ability to comply. So ability to
comply is essential to the issuing of the warrant and BYU was perfectly aware that
Appellant was homeless, in California, and barely had enough money to survive,
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yet remained silent when seeking that Order to require his attendance at the
7/19/05 hearing and then stood in silence when the judge issued the bench warrant.
Here, BYU however had an affirmative duty to not remain silent under
URPC 3.3(d).
As for the Constitutionality of the matter, Appellant was given no
opportunity to be heard relative to his ability to attend the hearing.
D. BYU Raises New "Fact" Not Raised In Lower Court; Must Be Struck
BYU App. Br. at 17 then interjects alleged facts not found in the record.
Here Appellant moves this Court to strike this material and the argument relied on
it. BYU includes and Addendum D - an email - and attempts characterize this as a
"promise" by Appellant to be in Utah on July 19, 2005. That material not in the
record has to be struck.
E. New "Fact" Not Helpful to Them
Second, if it is not struck, the email(s) show no promise by Appellant to be
in Utah on that date. Appellant is homeless and at the time extremely poor and
was required in another court case to do certain depositions in person in Utah.
Appellant thus had a need to be in Utah at some point in time, but not necessarily
on July 19, 2005. Appellant made a good faith effort to get the funds together to
be in Utah for those depositions and Appellant was manipulated into doing those
depositions on July 19, 2005 due to the supplemental hearing and arrest Order
threat as he had to attend the supplemental hearing on that date and would be
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arrested if he did not and if Appellant did gather the funds to travel to Utah, it was
only going to be once for some time as he did not have the funds to make 2 trips
there.
In the end Appellant did not have the funds to travel to Utah on the 19th.
While Appellant theoretically could have hitch-hiked to Utah it would have been
unwise. While it might be easy to put a liar label on Appellant and say he is
making the whole poverty matter up, he is not. He accurately portrayed his
predicament in the federal court hearing at which time BYU counsel heard, that
Appellant was homeless and barely had the money for food from day to day.
Appellant's affidavit for the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is also accurate
and shows little means for travel to Utah.
However, in the email, Appellant was anticipating being able to save the
money to get to Utah by the July 19, 2005 discovery cut off date for the federal
case. It would be, and was, an extreme burden to save the money to get there, and
optimistically, Appellant, in the email of Addendum D to App. Br. stated he was
planning on coming on that date. That email was some 2 months prior to the
hearing date. Appellant reiterates he used the word "plan" and not promise. The
word plan was exactly that, and contingent on a number of factors such as saving
the needed funds to get there. The other email Appellant used the word "believe"
with respect to his being their on the 19 . Certainly Appellant did not promise and
there is a big difference.
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The issue is not whether Appellant planned or believed he could make it,
but whether BYU was aware that Appellant did not have the means to make it to
Utah for that hearing.
Here, BYU was in attendance at the federal hearing where Appellant
honestly stated he was homeless and barely had the funds to survive from day to
day. That is significant. Appellant told the judge that in response to the judge
wanting Appellant to travel to Utah for the depositions, and Appellant had sought
to do the depositions by phone instead.
Thus BYU was in possession of critical information regarding Appellant's
ability to travel to Utah. BYU was very sneaky, highly sneaking and unethical, in
then seeking an Order, ex parte, which would require Appellant to travel to Utah
for a hearing or face arrest, yet withheld that information from the judge which
information was critical with respect to the arrest warrant as the judge according to
the case law must first determine whether Appellant had the ability to comply with
the Order to attend the hearing.
Yet BYU's deceit goes further. BYU would have this court believe they
had a good faith belief that Appellant had the means to get to the hearing. BYU
serves up a self serving statement, based on some unidentified source, that they
believed his parents were giving him money and therefore their conduct was
proper.

See App. Br. at 17. If BYU is to rely on that belief, they should come

forward with what information they relied on that Appellant was employed full
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time, when he was employed part time at near minimum wage. Further, what lead
them to believe he received anything from his parents. BYU comes forward with
no support to lead this court or anyone that their statement was nothing but a selfserving statement to avoid liability when they had no valid basis for believing that
Appellant was employed full time or received so much as a penny from his
parents.
BYU was present that the federal hearing where Appellant stated he was
homeless and barely had enough money for food from day to day. How they could
form a belief hisfinancialcondition was anything but that is implausible.
But an email from counsel for BYU shows that they in fact did not believe
Appellant had the funds to get to Utah. If the court noticed of R. 416 counsel for
BYU acknowledges that Appellant did "not have the financial means" to conduct
the depositions of the federal court case. This Appellant pointed out in the federal
court hearing at which counsel for BYU was present when he explained why he
could not travel to Utah for those depositions. They listened, they understood, that
Appellant did not have the financial means to get to Utah to do those depositions.
Although Appellant made every effort to get the money for the trip to Utah, it
proved insurmountable for a homeless person working part-time at near minimum
wage and living substantially below the poverty limit to get to the hearing.
Rule 3.3(d) states BYU counsel owed a duty to inform the judge of all the
facts material to his ability to make a decision ex parte. BYU could have made a
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motion like any other counsel and allowed Appellant to respond and the judge then
could have made a decision. But BYU chose not to do that. BYU chose to do it
ex parte, and BYU was aware Appellant was homeless, and barely had enough
money for food from day to day in California and that was material as the ability to
comply with a court order is one element that must be met prior to issuing a
sanction for missing a court hearing. See In re Cannatella,, 132 P.3d at 686.
Appellant did make an effort to vacate the hearing prior to the hearing date
by filing a motion to vacate it due to the improper reliance of URCP 69 which
Appellant believed was sufficient. That was filed with the court on 6/24/05. R.
288.

Appellant also attempted to stay the Order generating the need for a

supplemental hearing on 6/10/05 which would have obviated any need for a
hearing on 7/19/05. So it is not like Appellant did nothing to get the hearing of
7/19/05 off the calendar.
The need for the hearing, which was to determine the assets of Appellant
should have been satisfied by the affidavit of 6/6/05 R. 274 where Appellant,
under oath, lists a car worth $75 (it barely ran - no cooling system) as his only
asset in life, along with about $180 in the bank. Theoretically, the $180 could
have gotten Appellant to Utah but not back to California. Certainly, the court
should have noticed this predicament and the judge approved the in forma pauperis
motion for appeal.
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VI.
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Respectfully,
DATED January 28, 2007
£-JO^=T
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